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COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. GLEAVE,
Plaintiff-Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,
vs.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation, UTAH RAILWAY
COMPANY, corporation,,

(Case No. 20166)
(Case No. 20300)
Consolidated Case No. 20166

Defendants-Appellants
and Cross-Respondents
and
THE STATE OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONSE BY THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD
COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH MEMORANDUM OF
NEWLY UNCOVERED AUTHORITY

Pursuant to Rule 24(j), the appellant and
cross-respondent, Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad

Company ("Rio Grande"), respectfully submits this response to
the "Sixth Memorandum of Newly Uncovered Authority" (the "Sixth
Memorandum") filed by respondent and cross-appellant Robert L.
Gleave ("Mr. Gleave").
Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides that a party is entitled to notify the Supreme Court
of the existence of citations to supplemental authorities, but
the written communication to the Court "shall without argument
state the reasons for the supplemental citations."

Completely

disregarding Rule 24(j), Mr. Gleave argues that counsel for the
Rio Grande has committed an ethical violation by failing to
disclose the alleged fact that a federal judge (Honorable Bruce
S. Jenkins), in an unpublished opinion, "specifically
distinguished" a case relied upon by the Rio Grande in its
brief before this Court.

Sixth Memorandum at 3.

What, if any,

effect Mr. Gleave claims this alleged violation of ethics has
on the instant appeal is not set forth in his Sixth Memorandum
and no effect is apparent.
The case which Mr. Gleave claims to have been
"specifically distinguished", The Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad Co. v. West Jordan Municipal Corp., C-82-344J, was
itself an unpublished decision.

This decision was only cited

at one place in the Rio Grande?s brief and was cited in
conjunction with other cases for the proposition that federal
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trial courts uniformly have interpreted Utah law to vest the
exclusive authority to determine railroad crossing protection
with an agency of the State of Utah.

See Brief of Appellants

and Cross-Respondents at page 33, footnote 3.

If, as claimed

by Mr. Gleave, Judge Jenkins later had distinguished the point
for which the West Jordan case was cited, it would be of
little consequence since this very issue of Utah law has been
fully briefed and is now before the Utah Supreme Court in the
instant case.

It is this Court, and not federal trial judges,

which determine Utah law.

Nevertheless, the attack by Mr.

Gleave upon counsel for the railroad compels further response.
In sub-point B. of Point III of its initial Brief, the
Rio Grande asserts the proposition that the authority of the
Utah Department of Transportation to regulate railroad
crossings is exclusive.

See Brief of Appellants and

Cross-Respondents at pages 31-34.

The only reference to the

West Jordan case appears in footnote 3 which is found in this
section of the brief at page 33.

This footnote contains the

following sentence:
"Although the Utah Supreme Court has not been
asked to consider the exclusive nature of UDOT f s
authority over railroad crossings since the 1975
amendment of Utah Code Annotated §54-4-15, much
litigation has occurred in the United States District
Court of Utah concerning this issue and the federal
district judges of this state have uniformly
interpreted Utah law to preclude railroad and local
governments from any authority or duty to change the
crossing protection at public crossings." Id. at 33
footnote 3.
In support of the foregoing sentence, the Orders of
-3-

three of Utah's federal judges were cited, including the order
of Chief Judge Bruce S. Jenkins in the West Jordan case.
After this brief was written, Judge Jenkins entered an order in
an unrelated case, Wilde vs. The Denver & Rio Grande Western,
C-83-149J, which Mr. Gleave claims
the West Jordan case..."
3.

?f

specifically distinguished

Sixth Memorandum of Mr. Gleave at

This is a substantial misstatement.
Judge Jenkins did not in any way distinguish,

overrule, reverse or modify the opinion for which the West
Jordan case was cited.

Rather, he concluded that the West

Jordan decision need not be considered to dispose of the
particular motion then before him in the Wilde case.
"The court need not reach the merits of the
railroad's contention [that the West Jordan ruling
held that UDOT has exclusive authority with regard to
railroad crossing protection]. Even assuming that
the railroad cannot install warnings at grade
crossings without an express order from the
department of transportation, the railroad
nevertheless is not relieved of its duty to operate
its' trains with reasonable care." Wilde Memorandum
and Order at 11 attached to Mr. GleaveTs Sixth
Memorandum (emphasis added).
The above quotation from the Memorandum and Order
relied upon by Mr. Gleave in his Sixth Memorandum makes it
clear that Judge Jenkins assumed the West Jordan ruling to be
correct for the purpose of ruling on the motion which was then
before him in the Wilde case.

Moreover, later in the Wilde
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litigation. Judge Jenkins again accepted the proposition for
which the West Jordan case was cited by the railroad in its
brief before this Court.
The Wilde case was settled after the close of
evidence and just before the jury was to be instructed.

Judge

Jenkins had prepared his jury instructions and presented them
to counsel.

The following instruction was one which Judge

Jenkins indicated to counsel he would give to the jury.
"The Utah Department of Transportation has the
exclusive responsibility and duty to establish and
locate safety appliances, signals or devices at
railroad grade crossings in Utah. Therefore, you may
not find the railroad negligent for failing to install
additional warning devices at this crossing. However,
you may find the railroad negligent for failing to
take precautions within its control that a reasonably
purdent person in the same circumstances would take to
avoid injuring the public."
Although the settlement precluded the jury from
actually receiving the following instruction, it demonstrates
that Judge Jenkins continued to hold the opinion that the Utah
Department of Transportation has the exclusive responsibility
to determine crossing protection.
In the Wilde case, Judge Jenkins did not
"distinguish" his holding in the West Jordan case as claimed
by Mr. Gleave.

Rather, he extended it and was prepared to

instruct the jury properly that a railroad could not be
negligent for failing to install additional crossing
protection.

The "newly uncovered"
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unpublished authority from Wilde v. The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company is not adverse to the ruling for
which the West Jordan case was cited.

Indeed, the Wilde case

provides additional authority for footnote 3 of the Rio
Grande's Brief.
Finally, it is true that both the subject Memorandum
Opinion of Judge Jenkins and his proposed! jury instruction from
the Wilde case state that the exclusive authority of UDOT to
determine crossing protection does not insulate the railroad
from claims that it was negligent in the operation of its
trains.

The railroad does not challenge this concept.

For

example, the fact that only the State can determine and
implement the type of warning devices at a particular railroad
crossing does not relieve the railroad from blowing a horn or
sounding a bell as its train approaches that crossing.
Similarly, the railroad agrees that it could be found to be
negligent if it operated a train through a crossing at a speed
in excess

of the speed for which UDOT designed the particular

crossing protection at issue.
However, the railroad contends that so long as the
other safety factors at the crossing have not changed to make
the crossing more dangerous than it was when UDOT evaluated it
(e.g., new visual obstructions), then the railroad cannot be
negligent for travelling through the crojssing at the speed
which UDOT assumed for trains when it
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prescribed the appropriate protection for that crossing.

The

railroad cannot be negligent for operating as it was expected
to operate by the government agency with exclusive authority to
determine the warning devices which make the crossing safe.

To

that extent, train operation and the government's choice of
crossing protection devices are inextricably wed.

See Point

III C. of the Brief of Appellants and Cross-Respondents.

The

West Jordan case was not cited by the Railroad in its Brief
for this proposition.

The Memorandum Decision of Judge Jenkins

in the Wilde case, however, does contain language which could
be interpreted as contrary to the railroad's position in Point
III C.

The railroad believes this would be an incorrect

interpretation of what Judge Jenkins intended in ruling upon
the particular motion then before him.

However, if and to the

extent the subject Memorandum and Order of Judge Jenkins is
inconsistant with the position urged by the railroad

in Point

III C of its brief, the railroad requests this Court to reject
the analysis of Judge Jenkins.
DATED this /£

day of January, 1987.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
E. Scott Savage
Patrick J. O'Hara

By
Attorneys for The^Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company
50 South Main, Suite 1&&0
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
8257S
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICfe
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Response by the Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company to Plaintiff's Sixth Memorandum
of Newly Uncovered Authority and Affidavit" of E"I S"CuLL Savage
to be mailed this

l

^ *~~day of January, 1987, to the following:

Robert J. DeBry
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent and
Cross-Appellant
4254 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Paul M. Warner, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General for the
State of Utah
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
Utah Department of Transportation
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

